The Study of China’s “Non-interference” Principle (1989-2012)

本研究試圖分析中國大陸外交準則當中的「不干涉內政」立場，如何在後冷戰時期隨其外交姿態的調整而出現轉化。在外交姿態的分析上，在江澤民任內，先是面臨六四之後的國際制裁，後經歷共產陣營的瓦解震撼，基於政權鞏固的優先考量，當局對內專注經濟改革的推展，對外則採低姿態的「韜光養晦」方針來應對。此一消極的對外姿態，反映出其專注內部而非外部事務的思維，也讓不干涉內政立場因而受到強化。然而，隨改革開放的推演，胡錦濤任內開始遭遇到「走出去」戰略與「中國興起」現象的影響，並帶來的海外利益散布與國際責任加重等新議題，加深了其與國際社會互動的必要。這讓中國大陸往更積極的姿態調整，連帶地需要對既有的不干涉立場進行目的與手段上的重新界定。 在不干涉立場的分析上，本研究挑選了1993年柬埔寨大選內亂與2011年利比亞革命內戰為案例，對照江胡兩時期對不干涉內政立場的調整情形，並評估這些轉化背後反映的意涵。本研究發現，江時期放寬「介入」是為了解決冷戰遺留問題與跳脫國際孤立局面的特殊需求，胡時期則為維護海外利益與承擔國際責任等結構性壓力所誘發。此一差異突顯不干涉內政立場從堅守走向放寬壓力在變大。此外，在處理此一壓力的過程當中，中國大陸堅持「介入」需以不破壞穩定之目的不變，同時在低強制性干涉手段上有更多新實踐產生。最後，整個調適過程出於利益獲取或保障的比例，明顯要大於責任考量。這種跡象反映出所謂的調整是在發展目標不變之下，因應外部環境所為之的務實舉動，呼應了中國大陸「外交轉型」本質上屬於手段上的策略調整而非核心目標轉變之說法。This research tries to analyze how the mainland China’s noninterference principle, which has been the core concept of its foreign policy since 1950s, transforms with its diplomatic adjustment in the post cold war era. At the beginning of Jiang Zemin’s tenure, Chinese Communist Party was not only suffering from the international sanctions over the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989, but shocked by the Collapse of Communism between 1989 and 1991. All of these events let CCP leaders attempt to consolidate its power by focusing on economic reforms inside the country and keeping a low profile attitude towards foreign affairs, also known as Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy. It was this thought that makes mainland China to reinforce its noninterference principle. However, this passive attitude faced many obstacles during Hu Jintao’s tenure. The first is its “going out” strategy brings a lot of oversea interests spreading the world. The second is mainland China's growing power push it to bear more international responsibility to show its good intention. These obstacles make mainland China has to interact with the international society more frequently than before. In the meantime, this adjustment asked new CCP leaders to revise the existing rigid “noninterference” principle to make it more flexible. The research also examines how mainland China involved in the Cambodia in 1993 and the Libya in 2011 to show the subtle differences of noninterference principle between Jiang and Hu’s tenures and evaluate the meaning behind these adjustments. Firstly, the research found that getting involved in Cambodia was the only one case in Jiang’s tenure and it was ascribed to special demands, such as solving border disputes in the neighborhood and trying to pursue sanctions relief by supporting for U.N. intervention. However, the Libya case was the latest one among many that mainland China involved during Hu’s tenure. Unlike the Jiang’s tenure, there are plenty of structural pressures pushing Hu’s cabinet to ease the noninterference principle, such as protecting the oversea interests and bearing more international responsibility. Secondly, it unveiled mainland China deal with these pressures by showing its consistent stand that intervention should not ruin the stability in the recipient country, and must choose the less compelling measures. Thirdly, it argues that there are more interests calculating than responsibility taking when CCP leaders make their decisions to involve in other countries’ affairs. This corresponds to the opinion that there is more tactical than fundamental changes in mainland China’s diplomatic adjustment